Security games have been found to be useful and widely considered by the major security agencies. These games include two players -a defender, an attacker, and a set of targets. The key practical elements are that (i) the attacker can simultaneously attack multiple targets, and (ii) different targets exhibits various types of dependency, which depends on the applications being protected (e.g., protection of critical infrastructure IT and supply chain network security, etc.). However, previous models and algorithms fail to scale up and little is known of the computational complexity of these problem, especially when there exist dependencies between targets. In this paper, we investigate a general security game where the utility function is defined on a collection of subsets of all targets, and we provide a novel theoretical framework to show how to compactly represent such game, efficiently compute the optimal (minimax) strategies and characterize the complexity of this problem. We apply our theoretical framework to the network security game. In some settings, we provide a polynomialtime algorithm for computing optimal strategies; in other settings, we prove that the problem is NP-hard.
Introduction
In a Security game, the defender possesses limited resources and plays a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over all its possible resource allocations to n targets; The attacker chooses one target to attack. This model and its game-theoretical solutions have been widely deployed by the major security agencies (?). The nature of resource allocation results in exponentially many pure strategies for defender, and enables the size of linear programing formulation of such problem exponential in n. In the past few years, amount of works tried to resolve this issue in both theoretical and practical perspective, and various techniques are proposed such as the compact representation (?; ?; ?), incremental strategy generation (?) and oracle-based algorithm (?). Recently, Xu (?) proves that the complexity of computing optimal strategies of these games is equivalent to the complexity of an oracle problem defined on a set system.
A common restriction of above works is that attacker can attack at most one target or the utility functions for both players are additive, i.e, the payoff of a group of targets is Copyright c 2017, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. the sum of the payoffs of each target separately (?). In practice, there exists some linkage structure among the targets such that attacking one target will influence the others. The traditional models that ignore the inherent synergy effect between the targets could lead to catastrophic consequences. A quantitive analysis can be seen in (?). Besides that, there exists some works (?; ?) investigating the dependency among targets in the network security domain.
Unfortunately, current works for those security games under non-additive utility functions fail to provide a systematic understanding of complexity properties or provide an efficient algorithm. For example, Shakarian et al. (?) assumes that both attacker and defender can choose a subset of targets and their utilities are dependent on the combination of successfully attacked targets. They focus on the defender best response (DBR) problem and show that DBR problem can be solved in polynomial time only if the attacker can attack at most one target, while NP-hard in other cases. However, all their complexity results regarding DBR problem cannot be easily reduced to the complexity of determining defender's mixed strategies.
Specifically, we wonder how the following questions that are completely understanding in the additive utility functions to be tackled under the non-additive assumption, and we call such game as Non-additive security game (NASG).
• How compact can we represent the NASG and how to efficiently compute the mixed strategies of NASG?
• What's the complexity of computing the mixed strategies of NASG?
At a high level, the main challenge of NASG is that both the size of strategy space and number of utility functions is exponential in n. To answer above questions, we provide the following contributions: (1) We provide the condition for compactly representing NASG and prove that there exists poly(n) number of variables in the compact model if the number of non-additive utility functions is poly(n). The main technique is the isomorphic and projection of a polytope. (2) We design an algorithmic framework to efficiently compute the mixed strategies for NASGs via reducing original problem to a simple oracle problem. The main technique is the ellipsoid method and the construction of polynomial time vertex mapping algorithm from the compact space to the original space; (3) We prove that above oracle problem and the computation of mixed strategies of original NASG can be reduced to each other in polynomial time under some reasonable assumptions. Besides, we show such oracle problem is indeed an optimization problem of a pseudo-boolean function; (4) Finally, we apply our theoretical framework to the network security game and consider various cases. We provide polynomial time algorithm for some kinds of networks and security measures, while for other cases, we show the NP-hardness.
All the proofs in this paper are left to the supplement material due to the space limitation.
Problem Description and Preliminary
We begin by defining the NASG as a two-player normalform non-zero-sum game.
Players and targets: The NASG contains two players (a defender and an attacker), and n targets, indexed by set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Strategies and utility functions: The pure strategy for each player is the subset of [n]. In the general case, we consider the complete pure strategy space 1 of attacker and defender, defined as the power set 2
[n] = {V |V ⊆ [n]}, denoted by A and D, respectively. So there are N = 2 n pure strategies for both players. Let set function C a (·) : The mixed strategy is the probability distribution over the pure strategy space. Suppose p ∈ R N is a distribution over the pure strategy set A. The set of all the mixed strategy of attacker and defender are same and denoted as Ndimensional simplex ∆ N .
Tie-breaking Rule: When the attacker and defender choose strategy A ∈ A and D ∈ D, targets in the set A\D are successfully attacked by the attacker. Moreover, both players should pay the cost for their strategy, and the attacker's and defender's payoff is given by
Bilinear game: Suppose that the order of the attacker's pure strategy set is given by index function σ(·) : A → {1, 2, · · · , N }, define the following index function µ(·) for defender's pure strategy set 2 : µ(U ) = σ(U c ) for any U ∈ D. Then we can define the following utility matrices: the cost matrix of attacker and defender,
and the benefit matrix M ∈ R N ×N ,
Let M a and M d be the payoff matrices of attacker and defender. It's clear that
Then we can define the expected payoffs for the attacker and defender via following bilinear form, when they play the mixed strategy p ∈ ∆ N and q ∈ ∆ N , by
where the attacker is the row player, and the defender is the column player. Solution Concepts: In this paper, we assume that both players move simultaneously and the standard solution concept is the Nash equilibrium (NE). This assumption is pretty common for describing the interactions with terrorism, since the defender's actions are confidential in some cases (?). Our goal is to compute the defender's minimax mixed strategies and we call it as the min max problem.
Properties of NASG
Before we move on to the main results of this paper, we first reveal two important properties of NASG. Proposition 1. The benefit matrix M is symmetric under arbitrary index function σ(·) and
Proposition 2. The set of Nash equilibriums of NASG is equivalent to the set of Nash equilibriums of zero-sum game with payoff matrices
Indeed, NASG belongs to the strategically zero-sum game, in which the stackelberg equilibrium set is equivalent to the NE set (?). This proposition allows us to solve the NASG via the equivalent zero-sum game, which can be tracked by the linear programming approach. In the sequel, we use M 
The Compact Representation of NASG
Based on the equivalent zero-sum game M
• and von Neumann's minimax theorem, computing NE of NASG can be formulated as the following optimization problem,
This optimization model has 2 n+1 variables, which enables our problem generally hard to solve. The goal of this section is to develop a technique to find a condition of NASG that can be compactly represented with only poly(n) number of variables. To convey our idea more easily, we begin with an example, then we formalize this idea and present our general framework of compactly representing NASG.
Motivating Example
We first conduct the gauss elimination of the matrix M
• to transform it into the row canonical form, which is to left and right multiply M
• by elementary matrix E and F ,
where r is the rank of payoff matrix M • and M
• r is the non-zero block of its row canonical form. If we define the invertible affine projection
we can obtain the following optimization model.
Since the polyhedra ∆ a N and ∆ N is isomorphic, there exists an 1-1 corresponding among all their vertices. Similar argument for the polyhedra ∆ d N and ∆ N . Thus the optimization model (1) and (2) is equivalent. Further, considering the fact that only the first r elements in vector p and q have the non-zero coefficients in (2), we can further simplify it as
where the operator Π r (·) is to project the N −dimension polyhedra into its first r−coordinates and the formal definition will be given in the sequel.
Remark 3. The observation is that the number of variables in the model (3) depends on the rank of payoff matrix. For example, if the rank of M
• is poly(n), we can compactly represent NASG with only poly(n) variables.
The Formal Description of Compact NASG
Although above conceptually derivation provides a possible path to compactly represent the NASG, there exists a severe technical challenge: the elementary matrix E, F and their inverse matrices has exponential size, can we find both of elementary matrix efficiently? To tackle this problem, we first show that the payoff matrix M
• can be decomposed as the product of three matrices. The following definition and technical lemma is critical in our decomposition.
Definition 1. The common utility is defined as the following transform of the benefit function
Further, we have the following relation between benefit function and common utility.
Remark that the above definition and result is same with the cost function: C a (·), C d (·) and their common utility:
, and the details can be seen in supplemental material. Based on Lemma 1, we have the following decomposition in term of common utilities. 
Lemma 2. The payoff matrix
As can be seen in Lemma 2, such decomposition has a close-form expression and the value of each element of matrix Q can be determined in O(n) time. An illustration of above decomposition is given in supplement material. Before presenting our isomorphic and projection framework for NASG, we first provide several critical definitions. Definition 2. The support set of NASG is 
The Framework of Compact Representation
Isomorphic polytope: let elementary matrix E = Q −1 ,
T , ∀q ∈ ∆ N . Then the NASG is equivalent to the following optimization problem,
Projection of polytope: projects the polytope∆ a N into coordinate with index set in S , and∆ d N into coordinate with index set in S c , and further simplify (7) as,
where
and V S is a sub-matrix of D, L and V , which is obtained by extracting those rows and columns whose index set belonging to S and S c , respectively. • is poly(n), moreover, the NASG can be compactly represented by poly(n) number of variables.
Theorem 1 only provides a sufficient condition for our compact representation. Indeed, we can make it both sufficient and necessary by further conducting elementary elimination to transform the matrix D − L + V into an approximate diagonal matrix D. However, this process will significantly complicates our affine transformation f and g, and make it impossible to map the optimal solution of (8) to the original mixed strategy.
Implication of compact NASG: From the perspective of attacker's utility function, our compact representation indeed simplify U a (p, q) as
and similar result holds for U d (p, q). Based on affine transformation f , g, we can find that each variable p σ(U) is the probability that attacker attacks all the targets in U , while q σ(U) is the probability that defender does not defend any any targets in U . In this case, we can regard B c (U ), C c a (U ) as the benefit and cost for a "virtual target U ", and (9) is the expected utility in this new game. Remark 4. When all the utilities function are additive, the rank of payoff matrix r = n, and
each variable in the compact model is a marginal probability, thus the model (3) recovers the result of compact representation (?).
Currently, we have a compact representation of some NASGs, a natural question arises is that, can we efficiently solve such compact model and implement the optimal solution by the defender's mixed strategy? We will answer this question in the next section. In the sequel, the terminology NASG refers to a class of NASG that only has poly(n) variables in its compact model.
Oracle-based Algorithmic Framework
In this section, we will show that the computation of the defender's mixed strategies of NASG can be reduced to a simple oracle problem in poly(n) time, defined as, Definition 4. for any vector w ∈ R |S| , compute
. And the main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender's mixed strategies, if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender oracle problem.
It is not surprising that min max problem can be reduced to the defender oracle problem (DOP), and the reduction follows from a repeated application of equivalence between separation and optimization (?). What is interesting, however, is the reduction from min max problem to the compact NASG. Namely, how to map the optimal solution of compact NASG to the optimal solution of original NASG in poly(n) time. This direction, is the most demanding in various previous works (?; ?; ?), and requires an ad hoc manner. In the NASG, we show this could be done by exploiting the structure of the matrix Q to construct a poly(n) time vertex mapping algorithm.
Reducing Compact NASG to Oracle Problem
The compactly represented NASG (8) 
Compact-NASG
Above linear programming (LP) has poly(n) number of variables and possibly exponentially many constraints. One can therefore applies the ellipsoid method to solve such LP, given a poly(n) time separation oracle. To be specific, the separation problem has two parts: given arbitrary q and u, (1) membership problem: decide whether q ∈ H d . If not, generate a hyperplane that separating q, u and H d . (2) inequality constraint problem: decide whether all the inequality constraints hold. If not, find one violating constraint. We have the following result for those two problems Lemma 3. The membership problem and inequality constraint problem can be reduced to the defender oracle problem in poly(n) time.
Combining the polynomial solvability of both problems, we can easily obtain the polynomial solvability of the separation problem for compact model (11).
Reducing NASG to Compact NASG
A classical result in combinatorial optimization is that if the separation problem of polytope P ∈ R n can be solved in poly(n) time, we can decompose any point x ∈ P into the convex combination of at most (n + 1) vertices of P (?). Note that this is precisely the DOP required for above reduction. Applying this result to the optimal solution x * of (11), we can get a convex decomposition that
If we can map the vertices of H d back to the vertices (pure strategy) of original NASG, the mixed strategies of defender can be expressed as
Thus, the key challenge lies in how to compute h(v i ) in poly(n) time.
To tackle this problem, we need to understand the geometric structure of the projected polytope H d . First, considering an arbitrary pure strategy U ∈ 2
[n] , the corresponding vertex is unit vector e U ∈ R N with e µ(U) = 1. Based on the affine
where Q µ(U) is the µ(U )th row of matrix Q. Then the cor-
which is a sub-vector of Q T σ(U) . The problem is that the vertex in the high-dimensional polytope may not projects to a vertex of its low-dimensional image. However, the following lemma will provide a positive result. No matter which coordinate we project the polytope ∆ d N into, the number of vertices is still N , and they forms a submatrix of Q. Therefore, we can exploit the property of matrix Q to construct the following vertex mapping algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Vertex Mapping from Vertex to Pure Strategy
The correctness of algorithm is justified by following result, 
Solving NASG is a Combinatorial Problem
In this section, we will answer our second question, i.e., what is the complexity of the NASG, in the following restrictive class: the attacker attacks at most c targets, defender can protect at most k targets, where c is a constant and k is arbitrary; the defender's cost functions C d (·) are additive. In this case, we have the formal definition.
Definition 5. A D-NASG is given by the following tu-
, where A, D is the attacker's and defender's pure strategy space,
The set of benefit functions, attacker's and defender's cost functions are B = {B(A)|A ∈ A}, C a = {C a (A)|A ∈ A} and
This assumption is motivated by the fact that both players have limited resources (?) and they cannot cover any targets. Our result is the following theorem.
Theorem 4. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute defender's mixed strategy in D-NASG, if and only of there is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender oracle problem: for any w ∈ R
|A| , 
Reduction between D-NASG and Oracle Problem
The reduction from D-NASG to defender oracle problem still follows our isomorphic and projection framework, and the main technical step is a partial decomposition of payoff matrix M
• and choose A as the support set. The reverse direction follows from a different path. First, let the payoff matrix of D-NASG is denoted by M b ∈ R |A|×|D| , which is a sub-matrix of M
• . For simplicity, we use the same notation for the index function σ(·) and µ(·) such that µ(U ) = σ(U c ).
(17) where the matrix I ∈ R |A|×|A| and J ∈ R |D|×|A| are binary matrices with
|A|×|A| has the following non-zero elements:
Similarly, we can define the affine transformation:
|D| (isomorphic with |A| and |D| dimension simplex); projected polytope:
Further, the compact optimization model is expressed as,
where I a * is the set of vertices of polytope H a * . Since |A| = O(n c ), above compact optimization model contains poly(n) number of variables. The following technical lemma is based on the reduction between two separation oracles defined on two different polytopes. Considering the equivalence between the separation and optimization, we arrive the reduction between defender oracle problem (16) and compact optimization model (18).
The rest is to show the polynomial time reduction between the compact optimization problem (18) and the D-NASG problem. The reduction from D-NASG to compact optimization follows from a simple modification of our previous framework. The reverse direction follows from: for any arbitrary instance M A , we can construct the set of utility functions, B, C a and C d in O(2 c n) = O(n) time based on Lemma 1. Then we make an oracle call of D-NASG to determine the defender's optimal strategy q * and determine the optimal solution of compact model (18) in poly(n) time by constructing a poly(n) time vertex mapping algorithm from the pure strategies to compact space. reduces to each other in poly(n) time.
Lemma 7. The computation of defender's mixed strategy in
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 together yield our desired results.
What is the Defender Oracle Problem
Through a series of reductions, we show that the D-NASG is essentially an oracle problem. Nevertheless, the complicated form of polytopeH d prevents us from uncovering the mystery of the non-additive security game. Surprisingly, after some careful derivations, we will prove that the defender oracle problem is the problem of maximizing a pseudoboolean function.
Theorem 5. The defender oracle problem is, for any vector
The S is the support set as defined in (5), and S = A in this section. Clearly, the complexity of (20) is dependent on the set system S. For example, if S = [n], we can efficiently solve such problem via summing all the positive elements of vector w. This simple case corresponds to the traditional additive security game. Instead, if S = {U ∈ 2
[n] ||U | ≤ 2}, then above problem is a binary quadratic programming problem, which is known to be NP-hard.
Application to Network Security Domain
In this section, we will apply our theoretical framework to the security game defined on a network. The following definition is motivated by the works (?; ?). Definition 6. Considering a network G = (V, E) with node set V , edge set E, a network security game is given by the tuple (G, T, F , c, k) , where T is the network value function, F is the failure operator, c and k is the maximum number of nodes attacker and defender can choose.
The network value function T : G → R is a security measure assessing the utility of a network, and failure operator F : 2 G → 2 G is to generate a new network via a specific failure model after removing some nodes, where 2 G is all the subgraphs of G. For example, Shakarian et al. (?) adopts the number of connected load nodes as the network value function, and edge cascading failure model as the failure operator. Remark that we do not consider the cost function for each player and the main result is summarized as in TA-BLE 1. 
poly(n) Number of non-additive benefit functions is O(log(n)) poly(n) Constant c, negative common utilities except for singleton set poly(n) Constant k poly(n) Power grid defense game (Shakarian et al. (2014)) NP-hard Constant c ≥ 2 NP-hard and efficient heuristic algorithm
Positive Results
The first solvable class is motivated by the fact that the network in real World is sparse. The basic idea is to show that when the largest connected component of G is Θ(log(n)), the defender oracle problem (16) has a separable structure and can be solved in poly(n) time. The last solvable class is designated to those extremely dense network that almost every two nodes are adjacent. For example, if c = 2, attacking any two nodes will lead to the superposition of failure effect, resulting the sub-additivity of the benefit function and negativity of common utility. The technique is to show that defender oracle problem under such condition is indeed a submodular minimization problem, which can be solved in poly(n) time. The second solvable class. The third class is trivial since the size of linear programming model is only poly(n). Remark that last three polynomial solvable class is general and not restricted to the network security game. For the general network, the problem is NP-hard and we propose the following novel approximation framework, which can guarantee the approximation error of the original problem, instead of the oracle problem. The details can be seen in the supplement material.
Negative Results
Since the defender oracle problem is essentially the problem of maximizing a pseudo-boolean function, solving the general network security game is NP-hard. Another result is for the power grid defense game (?). The previous result is limited to the pure strategy, instead, we prove that the computation of both attacker's and defender's mixed strategy of such game (?) is NP-hard if c > 1. The idea is to design an bipartite graph with specific source and load, and link capacity and embed the quadratic binary programming with O(n) negative coefficients that is NP-hard (?) into such instance.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the security game under nonadditive utility function. We showed that the size of compact represented game is dependent on the number of nonadditive strategies, and NASG is indeed the problem of maximizing a pseudo-boolean function. Here the non-additive strategies means that the subset of [n] that has non-additive utility functions. Compared with previous result, this work greatly extends both the polynomial solvable class and NPhard class, and partly answer the question proposed by Xu (?).
The future research direction is following: in this paper, we assume the benefit of attacker is the loss of defender, which leads to the strategically zero-sum game and linear programming approach. A more challenging direction is if both players have different benefit function, how to answer previous questions.
